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INTRODUCTION
The end of the so-called “Cold War” has seen a change
in the nature of present threats and with it to the overall
role and mission of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact in 1991 also removed the original raison d’etre
of the Alliance: the prospect of having to repel a Soviet led
attack by the Warsaw Pact on the West through the so
called “Fulda gap” in Germany (referring to the German
lowlands between Frankfurt am Main and the former East
German border, which were regarded as the most likely
terrain for an armour led Soviet breakout) was replaced by
the recognition of the need to counter new – often hybrid
– threats, which have little in common with bygone acts of
interstate aggression. These new, modern threats to global
peace, prosperity and security seriously threaten the
present steady state environment at home (before the
backdrop of the ongoing asymmetric conflicts in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq) and warrant a
comprehensive, multi-stakeholder driven response.
Low intensity, kinetic and non-kinetic threats to
international peace and security including cyber war, low
intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism,
piracy, transnational organised crime, demographic
challenges, resources security, retrenchment from
globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction were identified by NATO as so called “hybrid
threats” (cf NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Capstone
Concept, 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040 Dated
25 August 2010: BI-SC Input for a new Capstone Concept
for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid
Threats (MCCHT)).
NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept
describes these hybrid threats as “those posed by
adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ
conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in
pursuit of their objectives.” (Hybrid Threats Description
1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 AND 5000
FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040 Dated 25 August
2010: BI-SC Input for a new Capstone Concept for The
Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats dated
(para 7)).
Having identified this kind of emerging threat, NATO is
working on a comprehensive conceptual framework (the
Capstone Concept) for identifying and discussing such
threats and possible multi-stakeholder responses. In
essence, hybrid threats faced by NATO and its non-military
partners require a comprehensive approach allowing a wide
spectrum of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic by military
and non-military actors (Updated List of Tasks for the
Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action
Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the
Comprehensive Approach, dated 4 March 2011, pp 1–10,
para 1).
NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT),
supported by the US Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular
Warfare Centre (USJFCOM JIWC) and the US National
Defence University (NDU), conducted specialised
workshops related to “Assessing Emerging Security
Challenges in the Globalised Environment (Countering14
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Hybrid Threats) Experiment” in 2011(cf NATO’s Transnet
Network on Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT) at
https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Transforma1/ACTIPT/J
OUIPT). The workshops of the experiment took place in
Brussels, Belgium and Tallinn, Estonia, and had the aim
of identifying possible threats and to discuss some or the
key implications that need to be addressed in countering
such risks & challenges. Essential is the hypothesis that such
a response will have to be in partnership with other
stakeholders such as international and regional
organisations, as well as representatives of business and
commerce.
This short article introduces the reader to a new form of
global threat scenario and the possibilities of response and
deterrence within their wider legal and political context.
NATO’S NEW COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TO COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS –
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The events of the so-called “Jasmine Revolution” in
North Africa during the so-called “Arab Spring” of last year
shook the political landscape in the Maghreb, the Arab and
the Mid-Eastern world. They generated also a variety of
hybrid threats: from failed state scenarios, civil unrest,
proliferation of sophisticated weaponry and even weapons
of mass destruction (the Libyan conflict allegedly led to
incidents of proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems
to regional extremist groups such as Hamas in Gaza; cf
Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas boosting anti-
aircraft arsenal with looted Libyan missiles” Haaretz, 27
October 2011) and the prospects of mass migration into
Europe caused by the Arab unrest in general and the seven
month NATO campaign in Libya in particular.
These events saw NATO in a more traditional role as
supranational defence and security organisation. In late
October 2011, the conflict in Libya had come to an end
with its leader al-Gaddafi killed and a new transitional
government, the National Transitional Council (NTC), in
power. This outcome was largely achieved by the
deployment of military force in a NATO led operation at
sea and in the air (Operation “Unified Protector”) in order
to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution
1973 (UN S/RES/1973 (2011)). The engagement in the
Libyan conflict highlighted how quickly NATO and its
member states can be drawn into military combat
operations, unofficially referred to as “kinetic operations”,
when requested to contribute militarily to peace
enforcement combat operations and/or so-called “stability
operations” (see for a definition US Army Field Manual
(FM) 3–07, Stability Operations).
Whilst Libya demonstrated how NATO could contribute
militarily to a UN sanctioned “use of force” operation in
the context of UN’s new “R2P” responsibility (also
referred to as “RtoP”, describing the international
responsibility to protect humans from genocide and crimes
and humanity and manifest in UN GA Resolution
A/RES/63/308 on the Responsibility to Protect) it also
showed an apparent rift among NATO’s member states in
terms of willingness and ability to commit military assets.
Only half of the Alliance’s 28 states actually committed
forces to the operation and the UK and France are
discussing changes to voting procedures in NATO, as well
as new bi-national military cooperation agreements as a
direct fallout of the operation.
In 2010, NATO issued its Lisbon Summit Declaration
(press release PR/CP (2010) 0155) where general challenges
to the Alliance’s present role as well as potential responses
before the backdrop of falling national defence budgets and
new threat scenarios differing from traditional “state on state”
armed conflict were discussed, often in the context of
increasing globalisation. As a consequence, NATO adopted a
new strategic concept which sets out its vision for the
immediate future and calling for “…NATO’s evolution, so that
it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new
threats, with new capabilities and new partners” (“Strategic
Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” of 19 November 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
and Lisbon Summit Declaration of 20 November 2010, PR/CP
(2010) 0155)).
Its main objective, however, remains the capability to
counter any threat arising for any of its member states
posed by both traditional external security threats as well
as internal security threats from a new source, including
terrorist attacks in a homeland security challenge. This
original role of protecting NATO’s member states from any
such security threats by all political and military means
necessary is supplemented by new competencies such as
the successful crisis management of even the most
“challenging crises” either by NATO directly or by
reaching out to new actors and stakeholders such as non-
NATO states as well as NGOs. Flexibility, cost
effectiveness, and eventually adaptability to new threat
scenarios, are key competencies in the new concept.
CYBER ATTACKS AS AN HYBRID THREAT –
A CASE STUDY ON THE APPLICABILITY OF
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
Cyber attacks resemble a kind of new hybrid threat
which gained more publicity in recent years. Cyber threats
resemble threats in the fifth dimension of warfare, as cyber
warfare is often termed, and refer to a sustained campaign
of concerted cyber operations against the IT –
infrastructure of the target state, including and leading to
mass web destruction, spam and malware infection. The
intensity of these operations, their “success” in terms of
disruption and denial of IT services as well as in terms of
disinformation and defacement, and lastly their objectives
which are political in nature and not just criminal (such as
internet banking fraught etc) warrant their nature as cyber
“warfare” and not just cyber crime.
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Cyber warfare passes the threshold of other cyber
activities such as hacking, spamming and phishing (see in
general Döge “Cyber Warfare. Challenges for the
Applicability of the Traditional Laws of War Regime” 48
Archiv des Völkerrechts (2010) 486–501). Cyber attacks can
be generated by state and non-state actor alike, but also by
groups of highly expert individuals or multinational
companies (consider the capabilities and opportunities
available to Microsoft, Apple or individual “figureheads” of
international IT): an example of cyber operations of recent
years which came to our attention was the 2007 attempt by
Russia to punish Estonia for its decision to remove a WW
II Soviet War Memorial from the centre of Tallinn. Russian
generated IT attacks virtually and literally “crashed”
Estonia’s internet infrastructure for a period of over three
days, and as a consequence state and political party
websites as well as banking and business websites were
effectively disrupted (“Russian accused of unleashing cyber
war to disable Estonia”, The Guardian 17 May 2007, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories
3.russia).
Russia used similar tactics in the 2008 Russian military
conflict with Georgia, employing cyber attack measures
against state and private targets in Georgia as part of the
Russian military campaign. Another recent example is the
use of Stuxnet, a sophisticated computer worm/virus
which targeted Siemens control systems which were used
in Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges in order to set
back Iran’s nuclear weapons programmes (“Stuxnet: Cyber
attack on Iran ‘was carried out by Western powers and
Israel’” Daily Telegraph, 21 January 2011 at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8274009/Stuxnet-
Cyber-attack-on-Iran-was-carried-out-by-Western-
powers-and-Israel.html). The potential of Stuxnet in terms
of technical advancement, possibilities and capabilities is
enormous: viruses which target industrial systems and
actively disrupt industrial processes pose a significant
threat to the infrastructure of any developed state. Such
cyber threats posed by China and Russia as nation state
originators and directed against the USA, NATO and the
European Union, led the USA and the UK to respond by
establishing a framework of possible counter techniques
including the use of kinetic options.
In the USA, a central Cyber War Command, the
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was
established in 2010 to “conduct full-spectrum military
cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all
domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in
cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries” (see
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/).
The UK followed suit and launched in November 2011 its
own UK Cyber Security Strategy which identifies the
importance of cyberspace for the UK and aims at
protecting UK interests in the fifth dimension by
enhancing cyber security. Whether this entails the
capability to launch own cyber attacks, is not disputed by
the government (see Daily Telegraph, “Britain prepares for
cyber war”, 25 November 2011 at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8915871/Brit
ain-prepares-for-cyber-war.html) whether this will also
entail kinetic options has to be seen.
These options are supplemented by “civil “law
enforcement and crime prevention actions by national and
international law enforcement agencies tasked with
fighting cybercrime, such as the European Cybercrime
Taskforce or the planned European Cyber Crime Centre.
Other stakeholders in combating such cyber threats are
specialised bodies and organizations such as the UN
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which in
collaboration with other actors such as the International
Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats coordinate
technical response mechanisms and coordinate crisis
responses. All these measures, from kinetic to law
enforcement to technical countermeasures form part of a
holistic approach in combating hybrid threats, thus
exemplifying the possible scope of countermeasures
available under the “comprehensive approach.”
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the author predicts that the emergence of
hybrid threats and their recognition as potential threats to
peace and security as such, the proliferation of low
threshold regional conflicts (such as the Libyan 2011
conflict and Syria), as well as continuing asymmetric
warfare scenarios (such as the ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and Pakistan) will have a significant impact on
the prevailing culture and prism of traditional military
activity, which is still influenced by concepts from the last
century. With such a change of military doctrines a change
of legal paradigms will be inevitable: new adaptive means
and methods of “flexible responsiveness” through
escalating levels of confrontation and deterrence will
question the existing legal concept of the prohibition of the
use of force with its limited exceptions, as envisaged under
Articles 2(4), 51 UN Charter and Article 5 NATO Treaty
(See Bachmann and Kemp, “Aggression as ‘Organized
Hypocrisy’ – How the War on Terrorism And Hybrid
Threats Challenge The Nuremberg Legacy”, 29/2 Windsor
Yearbook of Access to Justice (2011) for a detailed overview of
possible legal challenges in the context of kinetic responses
to hybrid threats).
Future direct intervention in failed state scenarios will
require flexibility in terms of choice of military assets and
objectives: the present concepts of “crisis management”
responses can easily develop further into a more
pronounced military engagement of an increasingly
“forceful” nature (see the 2004 Tsunami disaster relief
which saw civil relief efforts being complemented by
military efforts and assets to enhance own relief efforts but
also to provide military protection in terms of “force
protection”).
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Future responses to multimodal threats will also include
the kinetic force options; directed against – most
presumably – non-state actors. They will also affect our
present concepts on the illegality of the use of force in
international relations, as enshrined in Articles 2 (4) of the
United Nations Charter with the limited exceptions
available under Article 51 UN Charter, namely individual
and collective self defence (cf Art 5 NATO Treaty) as well as
UN authorization. Already today, the continuing use of
“UAVs” (unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones) for “targeted
killing” operations effectively emphasise the legal challenges
ahead: the ongoing “kill” operations in the so called “tribal”
Areas of Waziristan/Pakistan are kinetic military operations
demonstrating how quickly the critical threshold of an
armed conflict can be reached and even surpassed: these
operations clearly fall within the scope of the definition of
“armed conflict” by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia in the appeal decision in The
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1-A, 105 ILR 419,488) and
therefore giving rise to the applicability of the norms of the
so-called “Law of Armed Conflict”, the body of
international humanitarian law governing conduct in war.
The “lawfulness” of such operations does, however,
require the existence of either a mandate in terms of
Article 51 UN Charter (in the form of a UN SC Resolution
authorising the use of force in an enforcement and peace
enforcement operation context) or the existence of an
illegal armed attack in order to exercise a right to national
or state self-defence in terms of Article 51. Whether such
military operations are within the scope of these categories
remains open to discussion. Interesting in this context is
also the observation, that the newly codified Article 8 bis of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which
criminalises acts of aggression and which was codified in
2010 at the Kampala Review Conference, exclude the non-
state actor as a possible target/victim; consequently such
kinetic operations against non-state actors (cf the Israel
Defence Forces’ operations during the 2006 Second
Lebanon War against Hezbollah and the operations of Cast
Lead against Hamas in 2008/2009 as well as the continuing
use of UAVs/drones against enemy targets from the Taleban
and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan) remain outside
its scope of applicability and may lead to later
accountability questions.
NATO, assuming the organisational lead in countering
hybrid threats, may also turn out to be favourable for
shaping the Alliance’s future role before the backdrop of
the changing mission role and nature of the organisation:
its traditional role as provider of military capabilities for its
member states, as part of a collective self defence effort, or
for the UN, in cases of Article 51 authorisations will be
complemented by tasks of global risk and crisis
management. Countering new hybrid threats and taking
the lead in future joint, multi-stakeholder threat-based
responses could lead to a new role for NATO as a facilitator
of peace and stability operations.
NATO’s new strategic concept of 2010 will focus on
prevention as well as deterrence and aims at developing a
holistic or comprehensive approach to a variety of new
conflict scenarios of multimodal or hybrid threats: from
kinetic combat operations to multi stakeholder based non-
kinetic responses. The comprehensive approach is promise
and challenge at the same time; time will tell what legal and
political challenges will arise and how successful the new
approach will be.
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